Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP9832
Authors: Dean S. Karlan; Leigh Linden
Abstract: Commitment devices offer an opportunity to restrict future choices. However, strict commitments may deter participation. Using a school-based commitment savings program for children to savefor educational expenses in Uganda, we compare an account fully committed to school expenses to an account with a weaker commitment (funds withdrawn in cash, rather than a voucher).Children save more in the weaker commitment treatment arm, and when combined with parental outreach spend more on educational supplies and score 0.10 standard deviations (standard error=0.04) on test scores. The fully committed account yields no such educational improvements, and neither account finds impacts on secondary or downstream outcomes such as attendance, enrollment, or non-cognitive skills.
Keywords: commitment savings; educational resources; microsavings; school participation
JEL Codes: D12; D91; I21; O12
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| weaker commitment treatment (C78) | higher savings (D14) |
| higher savings (D14) | more spending on educational supplies (H52) |
| higher savings (D14) | higher scores on math and language tests (I24) |
| fully committed account (Y20) | no significant effects on attendance, enrollment, or non-cognitive skills (I21) |
| weaker commitments (D86) | enhanced educational performance (I26) |