Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP9780
Authors: Simon J. Evenett
Abstract: Several factors potentially responsible for the failure to conclude the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations are analysed. A two-stage negotiation and ratification game between the ?North? (industrialised countries) and the ?South? (developing countries) is employed and collapses into a single diagram. The choice of negotiating agenda, principles, and currency of the Doha Round interact with domestic political factors in leading WTO members, the fast growth of exports prior to 2007, and pervasive unilateral trade reform to eliminate the ?landing zone? for this particular multilateral negotiation. Recent emphasis on differences between developing countries and on Chinese WTO accession as independent causes of the impasse seems misplaced.
Keywords: Deadlock; Doha Round; Impasse; Two-level Games; WTO
JEL Codes: F02; F13; F53
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| interaction of negotiating agenda principles and domestic political factors (D72) | deadlocks (Y70) |
| political dynamics in both industrialized and developing countries (P16) | likelihood of ratification of trade agreements (F13) |
| principle of 'less than full reciprocity' (F55) | acceptable tariff deals (F13) |
| principle of 'less than full reciprocity' (F55) | impasse (D74) |