Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP9627
Authors: Robin Burgess; Remi Jedwab; Edward Miguel; Ameet Morjaria; Gerard Padró i Miquel
Abstract: Ethnic favoritism is seen as antithetical to development. This paper provides credible quantification of the extent of ethnic favoritism using data on road building in Kenyan districts across the 1963-2011 period. Guided by a model it then examines whether the transition in and out of democracy under the same president constrains or exacerbates ethnic favoritism. Across the 1963 to 2011 period, we find strong evidence of ethnic favoritism: districts that share the ethnicity of the president receive twice as much expenditure on roads and have four times the length of paved roads built. This favoritism disappears during periods of democracy.
Keywords: Ethnic favoritism; Public resource allocation; Democracy; Road building; Kenya
JEL Codes: D72; L92; O55; R48
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Ethnicity of the president (J15) | Public expenditures in districts (H59) |
| Coethnic districts (J15) | Road spending (R42) |
| Political regime (P16) | Ethnic favoritism (J15) |
| Political regime (P16) | Constraints on executive action (D72) |
| Ethnic favoritism (J15) | Road investment (R42) |