Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP9544
Authors: Dirk Engelmann; Hans Peter Grüner
Abstract: Optimal voting rules have to be adjusted to the underlying distribution of preferences. However, in practice there usually is no social planner who can perform this task. This paper shows that the introduction of a stage at which agents may themselves choose voting rules according to which they decide in a second stage may increase the sum of individuals? payoffs if players are not all completely selfish. We run three closely related experimental treatments (plus two control treatments) to understand how privately informed individuals decide when they choose voting rules and when they vote. Efficiency concerns play an important role on the rule choice stage whereas selfish behavior seems to dominate at the voting stage. Accordingly, in an asymmetric setting groups that can choose a voting rule do better than those who decide with a given simple majority voting rule.
Keywords: Bayesian voting; experiments; revelation principle; two-stage voting
JEL Codes: C91; D70; D82
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| introduction of a rule choice stage (Y20) | increased efficiency (D61) |
| introduction of a rule choice stage (Y20) | increased social welfare (I39) |
| agents choosing voting rules (D72) | better alignment of voting mechanisms with individual preferences (D72) |
| agents choosing rules (L85) | groups perform better than those with simple majority rule (D71) |
| efficiency concerns influence rule choice stage (D72) | proposals that maximize total payoffs (C78) |
| selfish behavior dominates voting stage (D72) | divergence in motivations across stages (D29) |