Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP9543
Authors: Antonio Acconcia; Giovanni Immordino; Salvatore Piccolo; Patrick Rey
Abstract: We develop an agency model of organized crime accounting for the main trade-offs involved by the introduction of an accomplice-witness program. We characterize the optimal policy and identify its main determinants in a framework where public officials can be dishonest. Our predictions are tested by using data for Italy before and after the introduction of the 1991 accomplice-witness program. As predicted by the model and the earlier antitrust literature, the program appears to have strengthened deterrence and enhanced prosecution. Moreover, consistently with a novel prediction of our theory, the evidence suggests that the program efficacy is affected by the judicial system efficiency.
Keywords: accomplice-witness; criminal organizations; leniency; whistleblowing
JEL Codes: K14; K42
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| introduction of the accomplicewitness program in Italy (K40) | strengthened deterrence (K42) |
| introduction of the accomplicewitness program in Italy (K40) | enhanced prosecution rates (K42) |
| introduction of the accomplicewitness program in Italy (K40) | decreased crime rates (K14) |
| efficiency of the judicial system (K41) | higher prosecution rates (K42) |
| judicial system is less effective (K40) | more generous amnesties are necessary (H84) |
| number of whistleblowers entering the program (I18) | number of mafia bosses convicted (K42) |