Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP9477
Authors: Erlend Berg; Maitreesh Ghatak; R. Manjula; D. Rajasekhar; Sanchari Roy
Abstract: This paper studies the interaction of incentive pay and social distance in the dissemination of information. We analyse theoretically as well as empirically the effect of incentive pay when agents have pro-social objectives, but also preferences over dealing with one social group relative to another. In a randomised field experiment undertaken across 151 villages in South India, local agents were hired to spread information about a public health insurance programme. Relative toflat pay, incentive pay improves knowledge transmission to households that are socially distant from the agent, but not to households similar to the agent.
Keywords: incentive pay; information constraints; knowledge transmission; public services; social proximity
JEL Codes: C93; D83; I38; M52; O15; Z13
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Social distance (Z13) | Knowledge transmission (O36) |
| Incentive pay (J33) | Social distance's effect on Knowledge transmission (C92) |
| Incentive pay (J33) | Knowledge transmission (O36) |
| Knowledge transmission (O36) | Program enrollment (I23) |