Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP9429
Authors: Federico Ciliberto; Amalia R. Miller; Helena S. Nielsen; Marianne Simonsen
Abstract: We study workplace peer effects in fertility decisions using a game theory model of strategic interactions among coworkers that allows for multiple equilibria. Using register-based data on fertile-aged women working in medium sized establishments in Denmark, we uncover negative average peer effects. Allowing for heterogeneous effects by worker type, we find that positive effects dominate across worker types defined by age or education. Negative effects dominate within age groups and among low-education types. Policy simulations show that these estimated effects make the distribution of where women work an important consideration, beyond simply if they work, in predicting population fertility.
Keywords: Career-Family Conflict; Fertility; Multiple Equilibria; Peer Effects; Workplace Interactions
JEL Codes: C31; J13
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| negative peer effects (C92) | dampen overall fertility responses to policy changes (J18) |
| small policy shifts (D78) | significant behavioral changes among workers (J29) |
| negative average peer effects in fertility decisions (J13) | decrease in the likelihood of an individual having a child (J13) |
| presence of additional coworkers having children (J29) | decrease in the likelihood of an individual having a child (J13) |