Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP9384
Authors: Kai A. Konrad; Tim Lohse; Salmai Qari
Abstract: We consider a lie-catching experiment with 9240 judgements. A set of videotapes shows subjects participating in a tax compliance experiment. The subjects chose whether or not to misreport. Subjects knew that underreporters were chosen for an audit with some probability. An audit led to detection and to a punishment fee. This compliance framework induced only persons with high deceptive abilities to underreport and, so, caused self-selection. Among the students who judged these videos, we find that the deception detection rate was significantly below 50 percent and even lower if the self-selection pressure in the tax compliance experiment was higher. This suggests that, when subjects can choose whether to state the truth or to lie, there is a self-selection effect by which individuals with higher deceptive ability are more likely to lie.
Keywords: decision making; interpersonal interaction; judgment; perception
JEL Codes: D83; H26
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| self-selection (C52) | deception detection rates (D91) |
| higher deceptive abilities (D91) | self-selection into lying (D91) |
| self-selection pressure (D91) | deception detection rates (D91) |
| self-selection influences detection rates (C52) | probability of being classified as dishonest (D80) |