Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP9350
Authors: Jean Hindriks; Susana Peralta; Shlomo Weber
Abstract: The explosion of globalization has increased firms incentives to exploit international tax differentials to their benefit. In this paper we consider a simple world with two countries with different market sizes and two multinationals with a division in each country. Both countries use a source-based profit tax on multinationals, who compete a la Cournot in each local market and use profit shifting based on the tax differential. We assess policies aimed to mitigate inefficient tax choices and show that tax harmonization cannot benefit the small country which adopts a lower tax rate to channel a tax revenue from the large country. We propose a simple revenue sharing mechanism in which countries share equal proportion of their own revenue with each other. It is shown that revenue sharing increases equilibrium tax rates in each country, reduces the tax differential, and benefits both countries despite of reallocation of resources from the high tax to the low tax country.
Keywords: Heterogeneous countries; Profit shifting; Revenue sharing; Tax competition
JEL Codes: F23; F68; H25; H70
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| lower tax rates in smaller countries (H29) | profit shifting from larger countries (F29) |
| tax harmonization (H26) | negative impact on smaller countries' competitive advantage (F69) |
| revenue sharing (H27) | increase in equilibrium tax rates in both countries (H29) |
| revenue sharing (H27) | reduction in tax differential (H23) |
| revenue sharing (H27) | benefits for both countries (F10) |
| larger country transferring more fiscal resources to smaller country (H87) | benefits for both countries (F10) |
| revenue sharing (H27) | alleviation of fiscal imbalances created by tax competition (H29) |