Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP9298
Authors: Jan C. van Ours; Ben Vollaard
Abstract: We provide evidence for a beneficial welfare impact of a crime policy that is targeted at strenghtening victim precaution. Regulation made application of the electronic engine immobilizer, a simple and low-cost anti-theft device, mandatory for all new cars sold within the European Union as of 1998. We exploit the regulation as source of exogenous variation in use of the device by year of manufacture of cars. Based on detailed data at the level of car models, we find that uniform application of the security device reduced the probability of car theft by an estimated 50 percent on average in the Netherlands during 1995-2008, accounting for both the protective effect on cars with the device and the displacement effect on cars without the device. The costs per prevented theft equal some 1,500 Euro; a fraction of the social benefits of a prevented car theft.
Keywords: car theft; crime; government regulation; victim precaution
JEL Codes: H11; H23; K42
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Mandatory application of electronic engine immobilizers (L62) | Reduced car theft rates (R48) |
| Regulation introduced in the EU in 1998 (G18) | Mandatory application of electronic engine immobilizers (L62) |
| Mandatory application of electronic engine immobilizers (R48) | Protective measure for cars equipped with it (L62) |
| Reduced car theft rates (R48) | Lower costs per prevented theft (K42) |
| Reduced car theft rates (R48) | Higher social benefits associated with preventing car theft (H55) |
| Mandatory application of electronic engine immobilizers (R48) | No significant displacement of car theft to related crime types (K42) |