Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP9296
Authors: Claudio Michelacci; Josep Pijoanmas
Abstract: We consider a competitive equilibrium growth model where technological progress is embodied into new jobs that are assigned to workers of different skills. In every period workers decide whether to actively participate in the labor market and if so how many hours to work on the job. Balanced growth requires that the job technology is complementary with the worker?s total labor input in the job, which is jointly determined by his skill and his working hours. Since lower skilled workers can supply longer hours, we show that the equilibrium features positive assortative matching (higher skilled workers are assigned to better jobs) only if differences in consump- tion are small relative to differences in worker skills. When the pace of technological progress accelerates, wage inequality increases and workers participate less often in the labor market but supply longer hours on the job. This mechanism can explain why, as male wage inequality has increased in the US, labor force participation of male workers of different skills has fallen while their working hours have increased.
Keywords: job heterogeneity; participation; wage inequality; working hours
JEL Codes: E24; G31; J31
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Technological progress (O49) | Labor supply decisions (J22) |
| Technological progress (O49) | Wage inequality (J31) |
| Technological progress (O49) | Labor force participation (J21) |
| Technological progress (O49) | Average hours worked (J22) |
| Wage inequality (J31) | Labor force participation (lower-skilled workers) (F66) |
| Labor force participation (lower-skilled workers) (F66) | Average hours worked (for those participating) (J22) |
| Positive assortative matching (C78) | Job assignment frictions (J29) |