Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP9270
Authors: Paola Conconi; Giovanni Facchini; Max Steinhardt; Maurizio Zanardi
Abstract: We systematically examine the drivers of U.S. congressmen's votes on trade and migration reforms since the 1970's. Standard trade theory suggests that reforms that lower barriers to goods and migrants should have similar distributional effects, hurting low-skilled U.S. workers while benefitting high-skilled workers. In line with this prediction, we find that House members representing more skilled-labor abundant districts are more likely to support both trade and migration liberalization. Still, important differences exist: Democrats favor trade reforms less than Republicans, while the opposite is true for immigration reforms; welfare state considerations and network effects shape support for immigration, but not for trade.
Keywords: immigration reforms; trade reforms; roll-call votes
JEL Codes: F1; F22
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Democrat affiliation (J79) | Support for trade reforms (F13) |
| Republican affiliation (D72) | Support for immigration reforms (K37) |
| Welfare state considerations (I38) | Support for immigration reforms (K37) |
| Welfare state considerations (I38) | Support for trade reforms (F13) |
| Ethnic composition (J15) | Migration policy decisions (F22) |
| Ethnic composition (J15) | Trade policy decisions (F13) |
| Skill ratio (J24) | Probability of supporting trade liberalization (F13) |
| Skill ratio (J24) | Probability of supporting immigration liberalization (K37) |