Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP9263
Authors: Gilles Saint-Paul
Abstract: When policymakers and private agents use models, the economists who design the model have an incentive to alter it in order influence outcomes in a fashion consistent with their own preferences. I discuss some consequences of the existence of such ideological bias. In particular, I analyze the role of measurement infrastructures such as national statistical institutes, the extent to which intellectual competition between different schools of thought may lead to polarization of views over some parameters and at the same time to consensus over other parameters, and finally how the attempt to preserve influence can lead to degenerative research programs.
Keywords: autocoherent models; degenerative research programs; identification; ideology; intellectual competition; macroeconomic modelling; polarization; self-confirming equilibria
JEL Codes: A11; E6
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Economists' preferences (D11) | Models they promote (C52) |
| Models they promote (C52) | Public policy decisions (D78) |
| Economists' preferences (D11) | Public policy decisions (D78) |
| Ideological alignment (P26) | Models they promote (C52) |
| Ideological alignment (P26) | Public policy decisions (D78) |
| Ideological bias of economists (A11) | Polarization in economic thought (P19) |