Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP9236
Authors: Martin Dufwenberg; Giancarlo Spagnolo
Abstract: A model of harassment bribes (paid for services one is entitled to) is developed and used to analyze the recent proposal to legalize paying bribes while increasing fines on accepting bribes. We explore performance as regards corruption deterrence and public service provision. A modified scheme, where immunity is conditional on reporting, addresses some key objections. We highlight complementarities with other policies aimed at improving accountability and performance of law enforcement agencies, and discuss the relevance for fighting other forms of corruption.
Keywords: bribes; corruption; immunity; law enforcement; leniency; whistleblowers
JEL Codes: D73; K42; O17
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Legalizing bribe giving (H57) | Enhance corruption deterrence (H57) |
| Legalizing bribe giving (H57) | Improve public service provision (H40) |
| Legalizing bribe giving + Increased fines for accepting bribes (K42) | Incentivized reporting of corrupt practices (H57) |
| Incentivized reporting of corrupt practices (H57) | Foster more accountable law enforcement environment (K42) |
| Legalizing bribe giving + Increased fines for accepting bribes (K42) | Enhance law enforcement accountability (K42) |
| Legalizing bribe giving (H57) | More transparent interactions between citizens and public officials (D73) |