US Special Safeguard on Imports of Tires from China: Imposing Pain for Little Gain

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP9217

Authors: Steve Charnovitz; Bernard Hoekman

Abstract: In 2009, the United States imposed additional tariffs for a three-year period on imports of automotive tires from China under a special-safeguard provision included in China?s Protocol of Accession to the WTO. China challenged the measure in the WTO. The case marked the first WTO dispute in which a challenged safeguard was upheld by the Appellate Body; the first in which an accession protocol was used successfully as a defense; and the first that China lost as a complaining party. It also was noteworthy in that the safeguard was sought by a labor union, and not the domestic industry. This paper reviews the WTO Appellate Body?s findings and discusses a number of the legal and policy implications regarding China?s Accession Protocol, the Safeguards Agreement, and WTO accession law, as well as economic aspects of the case.

Keywords: Accession; Adjustment; China; Globalization; Safeguards; Trade Disputes; WTO

JEL Codes: F13; F51


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
Imposition of tariffs on Chinese tires (F18)Material injury to the U.S. tire industry (L62)
Imposition of tariffs on Chinese tires (F18)Competitive position of the domestic industry (L11)
Tariffs (F19)Job preservation in the U.S. tire industry (L62)
Tariffs (F19)Net job recovery in the U.S. tire industry (J65)
Tariffs (F19)Mixed economic outcomes in the U.S. tire industry (F61)
Safeguard measures (D18)Legal precedent in WTO (F13)

Back to index