Too Systemic to Fail: What Option Markets Imply About Sectorwide Government Guarantees

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP9023

Authors: Bryan Kelly; Hanno Lustig; Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh

Abstract: We examine the pricing of financial crash insurance during the 2007-2009 financial crisis in U.S. option markets. A large amount of aggregate tail risk is missing from the price of financial sector crash insurance during the financial crisis. The difference in costs of out-of-the-money put options for individual banks, and puts on the financial sector index, increases fourfold from its pre-crisis 2003-2007 level. We provide evidence that a collective government guarantee for the financial sector, which lowers index put prices far more than those of individual banks, explains the divergence in the basket-index put spread.

Keywords: financial crisis; government bailout; option pricing models; systemic risk; too big to fail

JEL Codes: E44; E60; G12; G13; G18; G21; G28; H23


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
government guarantees (H81)price of index puts (G13)
government guarantees (H81)price of individual bank puts (G19)
price of index puts (G13)price of individual bank puts (G19)
government guarantees (H81)basket-index put spread (G13)
positive government announcements (E60)basket-index put spread (G13)
government guarantees (H81)perceived risk (D81)
government guarantees (H81)tail risk (D81)

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