Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP9009
Authors: Emmanuelle Auriol; Stefanie Brilon
Abstract: Two types of intrinsically motivated workers are considered: "good" workers care about the mission of an organization, whereas "bad"workers derive pleasure from destructive behavior. While missionoriented organizations take advantage of the intrinsic motivation ofgood workers, they are more vulnerable than profit-oriented organizations to anti-social behavior: bad workers only join them to behavebadly. To prevent this, monitoring has to go up in the mission-oriented sector, while the incentives for good behavior stay the same. In theprofit-oriented sector, by contrast, both monitoring and bonus payments for good behavior increase to control the damage caused bybad workers. As a result, in equilibrium bad workers are generally working in the for-profit sector where they behave like "normal" people,while good workers self select into the mission-oriented sector.
Keywords: candidate selection; motivated agents; nonprofit; sabotage
JEL Codes: D21; D23; L31
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| increased monitoring (E63) | antisocial behavior among bad workers (P37) |
| bad workers (J81) | antisocial behavior in mission-oriented organizations (P37) |
| lower levels of monitoring in mission-oriented organizations (L39) | antisocial behavior among bad workers (P37) |
| higher monitoring levels in profit-oriented sectors (D22) | normal behavior among bad workers (J81) |
| good workers (J83) | self-select into mission-oriented sector (J45) |
| bad workers (J81) | behave like regular workers in profit sector (J29) |
| increased monitoring in mission-oriented organizations (F53) | risk posed by bad workers (J28) |