Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP8949
Authors: Ella Segev; Aner Sela
Abstract: We study multi-stage sequential all-pay contests (auctions) where heterogeneous contestants are privately informed about a parameter (ability) that affects their cost of effort. We characterize the sub-game perfect equilibrium of these multi-stage sequential all-pay contests and analyze the effect of the number of contestants, their types, and their order on the expected highest effort.
Keywords: Allpay auctions; Sequential contests
JEL Codes: D44
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| number of contestants (n) (C72) | expected highest effort (D29) |
| contestant ability and order of participation (C90) | expected highest effort (D29) |
| mix of weak and strong players (C72) | expected highest effort (D29) |
| stronger contestant first stage (C72) | expected highest effort (D29) |
| excluding strongest contestant (Y60) | expected highest effort (D29) |