Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP8922
Authors: Dean S. Karlan; John List
Abstract: We conducted two matching grant experiments with an international development charity. The primary experiment finds that a matching grant from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation raises more funds than a matching grant from an anonymous donor. The effect persists, and is strongest for donors who previously gave to other poverty-oriented charities. Combining these insights with survey results, we conclude that our matching gift primarily works through a quality signal mechanism. Overall, the results help to clarify why people give to charity, what models help to describe those motivations, and how practitioners can leverage economics to increase their fundraising potential.
Keywords: Asymmetric Information; Charitable Fundraising; Matching Grant; Public Goods
JEL Codes: D12; D71; D82; H41; O12
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| lead donors (BMGF) (O19) | likelihood of donations (D64) |
| lead donors (BMGF) (O19) | stimulate giving (D64) |
| BMGF matching grant (H81) | average revenue per solicitation (H27) |
| BMGF matching grant (H81) | probability of individual donating (D64) |
| BMGF matching grant (H81) | probability of giving (C25) |