Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP8878
Authors: Helder Vasconcelos
Abstract: This paper studies the role of the failing firm defense (FFD) concept in merger control in a Cournot setting where: (i) endogenous mergers are motivated by prospective efficiency gains; and (ii) mergers must be submitted to an Antitrust Authority which might require partial divestiture for approval. It is shown that when the FFD concept is available in merger control, firms can strategically embark on a merger which makes other firms fail and then buy over the exiting outsider firm(s), leading to complete monopolization of the industry. This in turn implies that, in some circumstances, the consumers'-surplus-maximizing market structure cannot be achieved if the FFD concept is available, whereas it would be achieved if the FFD concept were ruled out.
Keywords: efficiency gains; endogenous mergers; failing firm defence; merger review
JEL Codes: D43; L13; L41; L51
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| FFD (Y10) | strategic mergers (G34) |
| strategic mergers (G34) | monopolization (L12) |
| FFD (Y10) | monopolization (L12) |
| monopolization (L12) | consumer welfare (D69) |