Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP8790
Authors: Alberto Chong; Ana L. de la O; Dean S. Karlan; Lonard Wantchkon
Abstract: Does information about rampant political corruption increase electoral participation and the support for challenger parties? Democratic theory assumes that offering more information to voters will enhance electoral accountability. However, if there is consistent evidence suggesting that voters punish corrupt incumbents, it is unclear whether this translates into increased support for challengers and higher political participation. We provide experimental evidence that information about copious corruption not only decreases incumbent support in local elections in Mexico, but also decreases voter turnout, challengers' votes, and erodes voters' identification with the party of the corrupt incumbent. Our results suggest that while flows of information are necessary, they may be insufficient to improve political accountability, since voters may respond to information by withdrawing from the political process. We conclude with a discussion of the institutional contexts that could allow increased access to information to promote government accountability.
Keywords: accountability; corruption; elections; information; voting
JEL Codes: D72; D73; D82; D83
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| information about rampant political corruption (D73) | decreases voter turnout (K16) |
| information about rampant political corruption (D73) | decreases support for corrupt incumbents (D72) |
| information about rampant political corruption (D73) | decreases support for challenger parties (D72) |
| information about rampant political corruption (D73) | erodes partisan identification with the corrupt incumbent's party (D72) |
| information about rampant political corruption (D73) | increase in the share of voters who do not identify with any political party (D72) |