Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP8733
Authors: Geoffroy De Clippel; Kfir Eliaz
Abstract: A group of rational individuals with common interest need to select one of two outcomes. The optimal decision depends on whether certain premises or pieces of evidence are established as being true, and each member receives a noisy signal of the truth value of the relevant premises. Should the group reach a decision by voting whether each premise is true or false, or should they simply vote on the outcome? We show that for any finite number of individuals, the premise-based voting rule is more efficient in aggregating information than the outcome-based rule. However, generically, the gain from using the premise-based over the outcome-based rule can only be marginal when numerous individuals express independent opinions. Indeed, the outcome-based game is almost always asymptotically efficient.
Keywords: common interest; discursive dilemma; doctrinal paradox; information aggregation; voting
JEL Codes: C72; D02; D72; D82
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| premise-based aggregation (C43) | quality of decision-making (D91) |
| outcome-based aggregation (C43) | quality of decision-making (D91) |
| number of individuals (C29) | efficiency of aggregation (C43) |
| premise-based aggregation (C43) | ex-ante welfare (H53) |
| outcome-based aggregation (C43) | ex-ante welfare (H53) |