Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP8644
Authors: Paul Collier; Anthony J. Venables
Abstract: Much African land currently has low productivity and has attracted investors purchasing (or leasing) land as a speculative option on higher future prices or productivity. If land deals are to be beneficial they need to induce productivity enhancing investments. Some of these will be publicly provided (infrastructure, agronomic knowledge), and some can only be provided by ?pioneer? investors who discover what works and who create demonstration effects. Such pioneers can be rewarded (incentive compatibly) for the positive externalities they create by being granted options on large areas of land. However, pioneers must be separated from speculators by screening and by requirements to work a fraction of the land.
Keywords: Africa; Farmland; Land Deals; Lease; Rent
JEL Codes: O13; O55; Q1
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| land deals (R33) | productivity-enhancing investments (O49) |
| government actions (H11) | land productivity (Q24) |
| government actions (H11) | investor interest (G24) |
| land deals (R33) | agricultural productivity (Q11) |
| screening mechanisms (C24) | productivity improvements (O49) |
| current land leasing practices (Q15) | future productivity improvements (O49) |
| expected future value of land (R52) | current land deals (Q15) |