Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP8633
Authors: Marco Battaglini
Abstract: We present a dynamic model of electoral competition to study the determinants of fiscal policy. In each period, two parties choose electoral platforms to maximize the expected number of elected representatives. The electoral platform includes public expenditure, redistributive transfers, the tax rate and the level of public debt. Voters cast their vote after seeing the platforms and elect representatives according to a majoritarian winner take all system. The level of debt, by affecting the budget constraint in future periods, creates a strategic linkage between electoral cycles. We characterize the Markov equilibrium of this game when public debt is the state variable, and study how Pareto efficiency depends on the electoral rule and the underlying fundamentals of the economy.
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Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Electoral competition (D72) | Pareto inefficient allocation (D61) |
| Smaller electoral districts (D72) | Enhanced Pareto efficiency (D61) |
| Larger electoral districts (K16) | Greater inefficiency (D61) |
| Marginal cost of public funds (H89) | Inefficient allocation over time (D61) |
| Level of debt fluctuations (E32) | Dynamic nature of political competition (D72) |