Grossman-Hart (1986) Goes Global: Incomplete Contracts, Property Rights, and the International Organization of Production

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP8598

Authors: Pol AntrĂ s

Abstract: I survey the influence of Grossman and Hart's (1986) seminal paper in the field of International Trade. I discuss the implementation of the theory in open-economy environments and its implications for the international organization of production and the structure of international trade flows. I also review empirical work suggestive of the empirical relevance of the property-rights theory. Along the way, I develop novel theoretical results and also outline some of the key limitations of existing contributions.

Keywords: intrafirm trade; multinational firms; outsourcing; property rights

JEL Codes: D23; F10; F12; F14; F21; F23; L22; L23


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
headquarter intensity (R38)integration decision (F15)
integration decision (F15)distribution of surplus (D39)
elasticity of revenue concerning investments (G31)ownership rights allocation (P14)
headquarter intensity (R38)outsourcing decision (L24)

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