Sinking, Swimming, or Learning to Swim in Medicare Part D

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP8585

Authors: Jonathan D. Ketcham; Claudio Lucarelli; Eugenio J. Miravete; M. Christopher Roebuck

Abstract: Under Medicare Part D, senior citizens choose prescription drug insurance off red by numerous private insurers. We examine non-poor enrollees' actions in 2006 and 2007 using panel data. Our sample reduced overspending by $298 on average, with gains by 81% of them. The greatest improvements were by those who overspent most in 2006 and by those who switched plans. Decisions to switch depended on individuals' overspending in 2006 and on individual-specific effects of changes in their current plans. The oldest consumers and those initiating medications for Alzheimer's disease improved by more than average, suggesting that real-world institutions help overcome cognitive limitations.

Keywords: insurance; plan switching; overspending; prescription drugs

JEL Codes: D01; D8; H51; I10; I11; I18


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
switching plans (P21)reduction in overspending (H62)
nonswitchers (C34)reduction in overspending (H62)
switching plans (P21)improvement in overspending (H62)
switching plans (P21)mean incremental savings (D15)
previous year's overspending (H62)likelihood of switching (C34)
age (85 and above) (J14)reduction in overspending (H62)
individual-specific aspects of plans (D14)switching decisions (D91)

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