Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP8573
Authors: Alberto Galasso; Mark Schankerman; Carlos Serrano
Abstract: We study how the market for innovation affects enforcement of patent rights. Conventional wisdom associates the gains from trade with comparative advantage in manufacturing or marketing. We show that these gains imply that patent transactions should increase litigation risk. We identify a new source of gains from trade, comparative advantage in patent enforcement, and show that transactions driven by this motive should reduce litigation. Using data on trade and litigation of individually-owned patents in the U.S., we exploit variation in capital gains tax rates as an instrument to identify the causal effect of trade on litigation. We find that taxes strongly affect patent transactions, and that reallocation of patent rights reduces litigation risk, on average. The impact of trade on litigation is heterogeneous, however. Patents with larger potential gains from trade are more likely to change ownership, suggesting that the market for innovation is efficient. We also show that the impact of trade on litigation depends on characteristics of the transactions.
Keywords: capital gains taxation; litigation; market for innovation; patents
JEL Codes: H24; K41; O32; O34
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| capital gains taxation (H24) | decision to trade patent rights (D45) |
| changes in patent ownership (O34) | likelihood of litigation (K41) |
| ownership changes (G32) | litigation risk (K41) |
| patents with larger potential gains from trade (O34) | likelihood to change ownership (G32) |
| ownership changes (G32) | lower litigation risk when sold to entities with large patent portfolios (G32) |
| trade on litigation risk (K41) | greater when patent fits buyer's technology portfolio (L24) |