Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP8561
Authors: Paola Conconi; Giovanni Facchini; Maurizio Zanardi
Abstract: This paper shows that electoral incentives deter politicians from supporting trade liberalization. We focus on all major trade bills introduced since the early 1970s in the U.S. Congress, in which House and Senate members serve respectively two- and six-year terms and one third of senators face elections every two years. We show that senators are more likely to support trade liberalization than House representatives. However, this result does not hold for the last generation of senators, who face elections at the same time as House members, suggesting that inter-cameral di fferences are driven by term length. Considering senators alone, we show that the last generation is more protectionist than the previous two. This result holds both when comparing di fferent individuals voting on the same bill and the same individual voting on di fferent bills. It is also pervasive: even representatives of export constituencies, in which a majority of voters should gain from trade liberalization, become more protectionist at the end of their terms. Inter-generational di fferences disappear only for senators who hold safe seats or are retiring. Our findings suggest that re-election motives lead legislators to pander toward the interests of protectionist voters.
Keywords: election proximity; term length; trade reforms
JEL Codes: D72; F10
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Senators (D72) | support for trade liberalization (F13) |
| House members (D72) | support for trade liberalization (F13) |
| Senators in last two years (D72) | support for trade liberalization (F13) |
| Senators with safe seats or announced retirement (J26) | protectionist behavior (F52) |
| electoral incentives (D72) | adoption of structural reforms (E69) |