Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP8519
Authors: Armin Falk; Florian Zimmermann
Abstract: This paper studies how a preference for consistency can affect economic decisionmaking. We propose a two-period model where people have a preference for consistency because consistent behavior allows them to signal personal and intellectual strength. We then present three experiments that study main predictions and implications of the model. The first is a simple principal-agent experiment that shows that consistency is valued by others and that this value is anticipated. The second experiment underlines the crucial role of early commitment for consistency preferences. Finally we show how preferences for consistency can be used to manipulate choices.
Keywords: charitable giving; consistency preferences; early commitment; experiments; social influence
JEL Codes: C91; D03; D64
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| agents who exhibit consistent behavior (L85) | higher likelihood of being selected by principals (I24) |
| early commitment (D86) | quality of estimates (C13) |
| prior commitments (L14) | subsequent behavior (C92) |