Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP8441
Authors: Matthias Doepke; Michle Tertilt
Abstract: Empirical evidence suggests that money in the hands of mothers (as opposed to their husbands) benefits children. Does this observation imply that targeting transfers to women is good economic policy? We develop a series of noncooperative family bargaining models to understand what kind of frictions can give rise to the observed empirical relationships. We then assess the policy implications of these models. We find that targeting transfers to women can have unintended consequences and may fail to make children better off. Moreover, different forms of empowering women may lead to opposite results. More research is needed to distinguish between alternative theoretical models.
Keywords: development; female empowerment; gender equality; marital bargaining; theory of the household
JEL Codes: D13; J16; O10
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| money in the hands of mothers (J12) | better outcomes for children (I24) |
| female empowerment (J16) | economic development (O29) |
| transfers to women (J16) | unintended consequences for child welfare (I39) |
| increased spending on child-related goods (D19) | reduced spending on essential public goods (H76) |
| reducing gender discrimination in private consumption markets (J16) | opposite effects compared to direct financial transfers to women (F24) |
| restricted access to private goods (H42) | prioritization of public goods like children’s welfare (H40) |
| reduced discrimination (J79) | shift in spending patterns away from child-related expenditures (D19) |