Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP8374
Authors: Samuele Centorrino; Elodie Djemai; Astrid Hopfensitz; Manfred Milinski; Paul Seabright
Abstract: We test the hypothesis that "genuine" or "convincing" smiling is a costly signal that has evolved to induce cooperation in situations requiring mutual trust. Potential trustees in a trust game made video clips for viewing by potential trusters before the latter decided whether to send them money. Ratings of the genuineness of smiles vary across clips; it is difficult to make convincing smiles to order. We argue that smiling convincingly is costly, because smiles from trustees playing for higher stakes are rated as significantly more convincing, so that rewards appear to induce effort. We show that it induces cooperation: smiles rated as more convincing strongly predict judgments about the trustworthiness of trustees, and willingness to send them money. Finally, we show that it is a honest signal: those smiling convincingly return more money on average to senders. Convincing smiles are to some extent a signal of the intrinsic character of trustees: less honest individuals find smiling convincingly more difficult. They are also informative about the greater amounts that trustees playing for higher stakes have available to share: it is harder to smile convincingly if you have less to offer.
Keywords: costly signaling; experiment; smiling; trust game; video
JEL Codes: D03; D85; D87; Z13
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Smiling convincingly (Y60) | cooperation (P13) |
| Perceived genuineness of smiles (E70) | cooperation (P13) |
| Convincing smiles (D91) | higher returns to senders (F24) |
| Costliness of smiling (D61) | Smiling convincingly (Y60) |
| Smiling (Y60) | perceived genuineness of smiles (L15) |