Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP8368
Authors: Monica Martinez-Bravo; Gerard Padro i Miquel; Nancy Qian; Yang Yao
Abstract: We use unique survey data to study whether the introduction of local elections in China made local leaders more accountable towards local constituents. We develop a simple model to predict the effects on different policies of increasing local leader accountability, taking into account that there is an autocratic upper government. We exploit variation in the timing of the top-down introduction of elections across villages to estimate the causal effects of elections and find that elections affected policy outcomes in a way that is consistent with the predicted effects of increased local leader accountability.
Keywords: accountability; democracy; institutions; public goods
JEL Codes: P16
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Introduction of local elections (H70) | Increased accountability of village chiefs (VCs) (H83) |
| Introduction of local elections (H70) | Reduction in enforcement of the one-child policy (J13) |
| Introduction of local elections (H70) | Reduced probability of land expropriation (H13) |
| Introduction of local elections (H70) | Increased public investment in village goods (H40) |
| Increased public investment in village goods (H40) | Improved schooling and irrigation (I23) |
| Introduction of local elections (H70) | Shift in accountability (H22) |
| Introduction of local elections (H70) | No significant effect on type III policies (G52) |