Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP8338
Authors: Pierre M. Picard; Bruno Van Pottelsberghe De La Potterie
Abstract: The present paper discusses the role of quality in patent systems from the perspective of patent offices' behavior and organization. After documenting original stylized facts, the paper presents a model in which patent offices set patent fees and the quality level of their examination processes. Various objectives of patent offices' governors are considered. We show that the quality of the patent system is maximal for the patent office that maximises either the social welfare or its own profit. Quality is lower for the self-funded patent office maximizing the number of patent applications and even smaller for the self-funded patent office maximizing the number of granted patents. A labor union improves examination quality and may compensate for the potentialy inappropriate objectives of patent office management.
Keywords: intellectual property; patent system; public firm; organization; quality
JEL Codes: L30; O30; O31; O34; O38
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Social planner governance (P11) | maximal quality (L15) |
| Self-funded offices prioritizing applications (I23) | lower quality (L15) |
| Presence of unions (J51) | improved quality (L15) |
| Quality of patent examination (L15) | uncertainty associated with patent rights (D89) |
| Uncertainty associated with patent rights (D89) | likelihood of successful patent enforcement in litigation (K41) |
| Higher quality patent systems (L15) | higher probability of patent validation in courts (K11) |