Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP8245
Authors: Giovanni Facchini; Cecilia Testa
Abstract: Despite restrictive migration policies, large numbers of undocumented migrants reside in many destination countries. If official migration targets are not enforced, why are they devised? To address this puzzle, we develop a political agency model with uncertainty on the migrants' supply, where an elected official can either have preferences congruent with the median voter, or prefer a larger number of migrants. We show that, if the incumbent prefers more migrants than the median, he might find it optimal to announce a binding quota to be re-elected, and strategically relax its enforcement, or choose an ineffective instrument like border control.
Keywords: illegal immigration; immigration policy; political economy
JEL Codes: F22; J61
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Electoral incentives (D72) | Inefficient policies (H21) |
| Inefficient policies (H21) | Illegal immigration (K37) |
| Electoral incentives (D72) | Policy setting (binding quotas) (E64) |
| Policy setting (binding quotas) (E64) | Enforcement decisions (relaxation of enforcement) (K40) |
| Enforcement decisions (relaxation of enforcement) (K40) | Illegal immigration (K37) |
| Electoral incentives (D72) | Illegal immigration (K37) |