Efficient and Inefficient Welfare States

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP8229

Authors: Yann Algan; Pierre Cahuc; Marc Sangnier

Abstract: This paper shows that cross country differences in the generosity and the quality of the welfare state are associated with differences in the trustworthiness of their citizens. We show that generous, transparent and efficient welfare states in Scandinavian countries are based on the civicness of their citizens. In contrast, the generosity but low transparency of the Continental European welfare states survive thanks to the support of a large share of uncivic individuals who consider that it can be justifiable to misbehave with taxes and social benefits. We also explain why countries with an intermediate degree of trustworthiness of their citizens and of transparency of the government, like Anglo-Saxon countries, have small welfare states. Overall, this paper provides a rationale for the observed persistence of both efficient and inefficient welfare states, as a function of the civicness of the citizens.

Keywords: civism; corruption; trust; welfare state

JEL Codes: H1; Z1


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
generalized trust (Z13)support for welfare state (I38)
civic individuals (Z18)support for welfare state (I38)
uncivic individuals (P37)preference for generous social programs (H53)
civic individuals (Z18)efficiency of welfare states (I38)
uncivic individuals (P37)inefficiencies in welfare states (H53)
social expenditure (H53)perceived quality of welfare services (I31)
trust and government transparency (H57)perceived quality of welfare services (I31)

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