Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP8146
Authors: Marco Battaglini; Uliana Makarov
Abstract: We examine strategic information transmission in a controlled laboratory experiment of a cheap talk game with one sender and multiple receivers. We study the change in equilibrium behavior from the addition of another audience as well as from varying the degree of conflict between the sender's and receivers' preferences. We find that, as in cheap talk games with just one receiver, information transmission is higher in games with a separating equilibrium, than in games with only a babbling equilibrium. More interestingly, we find clear evidence that the addition of another audience alters the communication between the sender and the receiver in a way consistent with the theoretical predictions. Deviations from the theoretical predictions that we observe tend to disappear with experience, and learning is faster precisely in the games where deviations are more pronounced.
Keywords: cheap talk; communication; experiment
JEL Codes: C92; D82; D83
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| audience size (L25) | communication dynamics (L96) |
| conflict (D74) | communication strategies (L96) |
| audience size (L25) | information transmission (L96) |
| second receiver (Y60) | deviations from expected behavior (D91) |
| one-sided discipline (Y80) | truthful information revelation (D83) |
| mutual discipline (Y80) | truthful information revelation (D83) |
| subversion scenarios (P37) | reduced communication (L96) |
| game structure (C72) | receivers' trust in senders' messages (D83) |