Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP8082
Authors: Antonio Estache; Liam Wren-Lewis
Abstract: This paper reviews the theories of corruption in regulated sectors to further understand the impact of corruption and the ways in which it can be reduced. The aim is to draw out the policy implications of the different theoretical approaches and to examine the support that can be garnered for such policies from empirical evidence and practice. We then attempt to draw out some of the broader lessons that can be learnt for anti-corruption policy in general.
Keywords: Infrastructure; Regulation; Corruption
JEL Codes: D73; D82; L5; L9
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| corruption in regulated industries (K23) | political rents associated with large investments and operational contracts (H57) |
| political rents associated with large investments and operational contracts (H57) | inefficiencies and increased costs (D61) |
| self-regulation (L51) | corruption (D73) |
| moving from self-regulation to independent regulation (L51) | mitigate corruption (H57) |
| corruption (D73) | redistribution of rents (D33) |
| corruption (D73) | changes to economic efficiency (D61) |
| increased number of regulators or consumer advocates (L51) | reduce corruption (H57) |
| privatization (L33) | reduce certain types of corruption (H57) |
| privatization (L33) | create new forms of inefficiency (D61) |