Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP8012
Authors: Xin Meng; Nancy Qian; Pierre Yared
Abstract: This paper investigates the institutional causes of China's Great Famine. It presents two empirical findings: 1) in 1959, when the famine began, food production was almost three times more than population subsistence needs; and 2) regions with higher per capita food production that year suffered higher famine mortality rates, a surprising reversal of a typically negative correlation. A simple model based on historical institutional details shows that these patterns are consistent with government policy failure in a centrally planned economy in which the government is unable to easily collect and respond to new information in the presence of an aggregate shock to production.
Keywords: Central Planning; Development; Food Procurement; Institutions; Modern Chinese History; Prices vs Quantities
JEL Codes: N45; O45; P2
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Government policy failure in food distribution (H84) | Famine severity (H84) |
| Higher per capita food production in 1959 (Q11) | Higher famine mortality rates (J11) |
| Inflexible food procurement system + Drop in aggregate food production (Q11) | Severe famine outcomes (H84) |
| Government's inability to adjust procurement policies (H57) | Overprocurement in agricultural areas (Q13) |
| Overprocurement in agricultural areas (Q13) | Exacerbated mortality rates (I14) |