Incentives, Resources and the Organization of the School System

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP7964

Authors: Facundo Albornoz; Samuel Berlinski; Antonio Cabrales

Abstract: We study a model where student e ort and talent interact with parental and teachers' investments, as well as with school system resources. The model is rich, yet sufficiently stylized to provide novel implications. We can show, for example, that an improvement in parental outside options will reduce parental and school eff ort, which are partially compensated through school resources. In this way we provide a rationale for the ambiguous existing empirical evidence on the e ffect of school resources. We also provide a novel microfoundation for peer e ffects, with empirical implications on welfare and on preferences for sorting across schools.

Keywords: education; parental effort; school resources

JEL Codes: I20; I21; I28


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
Parental outside options (J12)Parental effort (J13)
Parental outside options (J12)School effort (I21)
Parental outside options (J12)School resources (I20)
Parental opportunity cost (J13)Parental incentives (J13)
Parental incentives (J13)Student effort (D29)
School resources (I20)Educational attainment (I21)
Peer ability (C92)Student effort (D29)

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