Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP7938
Authors: Mike Burkart; Samuel Lee
Abstract: We examine whether a bidder can use tender offer terms to signal post-takeover security benefits. Neither restricted bids nor cash-equity offers allow the bidder to reveal private information. Since atomistic shareholders extract all the gains in security benefits, signaling equilibria are subject to a constraint that is absent from bilateral trade models: The bidder must enjoy gains from trade that are excluded from bargaining (private benefits) but can nonetheless be relinquished. Dilution, debt financing, and toeholds are viable signaling devices because they imply private benefits that depend on security benefits in a predictable manner. In these signaling equilibria, lower-valued types must forgo a larger fraction of their private gains, and these costs can prevent some takeovers. Strikingly, the separation of cash flow and voting rights overcomes the asymmetric information problem. Offers that include derivatives allow for a complete separation and can therefore implement the symmetric information outcome.
Keywords: freerider problem; means of payment; restricted bids; signaling; two-dimensional types
JEL Codes: G32
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| bidders cannot reveal their type through offer terms (D44) | collective action problem faced by dispersed shareholders (G34) |
| signaling equilibria can emerge (C73) | bidders relinquish private benefits (D44) |
| bidders commit to relinquishing private benefits (D44) | signal their type effectively (L15) |
| lower-valued bidders must forgo more private benefits (D44) | convey their type credibly (Z13) |
| separation of cash flow and voting rights (G34) | resolve the asymmetric information problem (D82) |
| use of cash-equity offers should be less pronounced in tender offers (G34) | negotiated mergers (G34) |
| correlation between cash as a means of payment (E41) | takeover gains (G34) |