Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP7926
Authors: Rodney D. Ludema; Anna Maria Mayda; Prachi Mishra
Abstract: This paper studies the political influence of individual firms on Congressional decisions to suspend tariffs on U.S. imports of intermediate goods. We develop a model in which firms influence the government by transmitting information about the value of protection, via costless messages (cheap-talk) and costly messages (lobbying). We estimate our model using firm-level data on tariff suspension bills and lobbying expenditures from 1999-2006, and find that indeed verbal opposition by import-competing firms, with no lobbying, significantly reduces the probability of a suspension being granted. In addition, lobbying expenditures by proponent and opponent firms sway this probability in opposite directions.
Keywords: cheap talk; endogenous protection; tariff suspensions
JEL Codes: F13
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| verbal opposition (D74) | probability of suspension (C46) |
| proponent lobbying (D72) | probability of suspension (C46) |
| opponent lobbying (L49) | probability of suspension (C46) |