Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP7879
Authors: Gaetan de Rassenfosse; Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie
Abstract: This paper reviews the economic literature on the role of fees in patent systems. Two main research questions are usually addressed: the impact of patent fees on the behavior of applicants and the question of optimal fees. Studies in the former group confirm that a range of fees affect the behavior of applicants and suggest that a patent is an inelastic good. Studies in the latter group provide grounds for both low and high application (or pre-grant) fees and renewal (or post-grant) fees, depending on the structural context and on the policy objectives. The paper also presents new stylized facts on patent fees of thirty patent offices worldwide. It is shown that application fees are generally lower than renewal fees, and renewal fees increase more than proportionally with patent age (to the notable exception of Switzerland and the U.S.).
Keywords: application fees; intellectual property policy; patent system; price elasticity; renewal fees
JEL Codes: O30; O31; O38; O57
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Higher patent fees (D45) | Decrease in number of applications filed (J63) |
| Renewal fees increase more than proportionally with patent age (D45) | Decision to maintain patents (O34) |
| Application fees are generally lower than renewal fees (R48) | Observed behavior of applicants (C99) |