Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP7768
Authors: Simon P. Anderson; John McLaren
Abstract: We present an economic model of media bias and media mergers. Media owners have political motives as well as profit motives, and can influence public opinion by withholding information that is pejorative to their political agenda - provided that their agenda is not too far from the political mainstream. This is true even with rational consumers who understand the media owners? biases, because the public do not know how much information the news organizations have and so do not know when news is being withheld. In line with conventional wisdom, this problem can be undone by competition; but competition can be defeated in equilibrium by media mergers that enhance profits at the expense of the public interest. We thus derive a motive for media merger policy that is completely distinct from the motives behind conventional antitrust. While media bias may reduce the profit incentives to merge, media markets nonetheless err to being insufficiently competitive, and the consequences of merger are more severe than in other markets.
Keywords: Information Withholding; Market for News; Media Bias; Media Mergers
JEL Codes: D23; L82
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Media Ownership Motives (L21) | Media Bias (J15) |
| Media Bias (J15) | Public Opinion (D72) |
| Media Mergers (G34) | Reduced Competition (L49) |
| Reduced Competition (L49) | Withholding of Information (H26) |
| Withholding of Information (H26) | Manipulated Political Outcomes (D72) |
| Media Mergers (G34) | Public Interest (L44) |