Rational Inattention to Subsidies for Charitable Contributions

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP7760

Authors: Kimberley Ann Scharf; Sarah L. Smith

Abstract: Recent evidence suggests that individuals do not always take notice of tax attributes when making their choices. This paper focuses on the case of tax relief for charitable contributions. Although a fully rational donor should view a matched payment to the receiving charity and a tax rebate of the same value as being fully equivalent, evidence from a survey shows that nominal donations are significantly more likely to adjust in response to a change in the tax rebate than to a corresponding change in the match. The patterns of responses across different donors that emerge from the survey cannot be readily explained by the presence of administrative costs or differential warm-glow effects, nor from the match being a more "shrouded" attribute in comparison with the rebate. Rather, we argue that these patterns are consistent with the predictions of a model of rational inattention, whereby a majority of individuals deliberately choose to process changes in the rebate while forgoing to process changes in the match.

Keywords: Rational Inattention; Salience; Subsidies for Giving; Tax Incentives

JEL Codes: D0; D8; H2


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
tax rebate (H20)donation levels (D64)
tax match (H26)donation levels (D64)
donor size (F35)responsiveness to tax incentives (H32)
rational inattention (D80)neglect of tax match (H26)

Back to index