Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP7724
Authors: Benno Buehler; Anke Kessler
Abstract: This paper provides an explanation for why political leaders may want to adopt ideological positions and maintain them over time even in the face of conflicting evidence. We study a dynamic framework in which politicians are better informed than the voting public about an underlying state of nature that determines the desirability of a given policy measure. The issue itself is non-partisan (everybody has the same policy preferences) but voters attach ideological labels to both candidates and available policy alternatives. We show that both sides may be caught in an ideology trap: because voters expect the perceived ideology of office holders to determine their political actions, politicians are tempted to act according to their perceived ideology, resulting in political failure.
Keywords: ideology; partisanship; polarization; policy persistence; political competition
JEL Codes: H11; N40
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| voter expectations (K16) | political leaders' ideological positions (D72) |
| political leaders' ideological positions (D72) | political actions (D72) |
| voter expectations (K16) | political actions (D72) |
| political actions (D72) | electoral incentives (D72) |
| voter expectations (K16) | policy bias (J78) |
| political leaders' ideological positions (D72) | policy divergence (F68) |