Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP7648
Authors: Avner Greif; Guido Tabellini
Abstract: How to sustain cooperation is a key challenge for any society. Different social organizations have evolved in the course of history to cope with this challenge by relying on different combinations of external (formal and informal) enforcement institutions and intrinsic motivation. Some societies rely more on informal enforcement and moral obligations within their constituting groups. Others rely more on formal enforcement and general moral obligations towards society at large. How do culture and institutions interact in generating different evolutionary trajectories of societal organizations? Do contemporary attitudes, institutions and behavior reflect distinct pre-modern trajectories?
Keywords: China; City; Cooperation; Culture; Value
JEL Codes: E11; N13; N15
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| initial moral systems (A13) | cultural trajectories (Z10) |
| initial moral systems (A13) | institutional trajectories (B15) |
| kinship organizations (J12) | cultural trajectories (Z10) |
| kinship organizations (J12) | institutional trajectories (B15) |
| cultural transmission (Z13) | societal organizations (L39) |
| initial conditions (C62) | clans in China (P32) |
| initial conditions (C62) | cities in Europe (N93) |
| clans (Z13) | enforcement costs (K40) |
| cities (R12) | formal enforcement mechanisms (K40) |
| individual preferences (D11) | societal organizations (L39) |
| initial distribution of values (D39) | societal organizations (L39) |