Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP7639
Authors: James Albrecht; Pieter A. Gautier; Susan Vroman
Abstract: In this paper, we present a directed search model of the housing market. The pricing mechanism we analyze reflects the way houses are bought and sold in the United States. Our model is consistent with the observation that houses are sometimes sold above, sometimes below and sometimes at the asking price. We consider two versions of our model. In the first version, all sellers have the same reservation value. In the second version, there are two seller types, and type is private information. For both versions, we characterize the equilibrium of the game played by buyers and sellers, and we prove efficiency. Our model offers a new way to look at the housing market from a search-theoretic perspective. In addition, we contribute to the directed search literature by considering a model in which the asking price (i) entails only limited commitment and (ii) has the potential to signal seller type.
Keywords: directed search; housing
JEL Codes: D83; R31
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| seller type (L85) | pricing mechanism (D49) |
| seller type (L85) | asking price (D44) |
| asking price (D44) | buyer perception (M31) |
| seller type (L85) | buyer perception (M31) |