Can We Infer Social Preferences from the Lab Evidence from the Trust Game

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP7634

Authors: Nicole M. Baran; Paola Sapienza; Luigi Zingales

Abstract: We show that a measure of reciprocity derived from the Berg et al. (1995) trust game in a laboratory setting predicts the reciprocal behavior of the same subjects in a real-world situation. By using the Crowne and Marlowe (1960) social desirability scale, we do not find any evidence that a desire to conform to social norms distorts results in the lab, yet we do find evidence that it affects results in the field.

Keywords: donation; field and lab experiments; reciprocity

JEL Codes: C9; D64; H41


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
Responder behavior in the trust game (C72)Amount donated (D64)
Fraction returned by the responder (Y60)Amount donated (D64)
Social desirability (Z13)Amount donated (D64)
Social desirability (Z13)Responder behavior in the trust game (C72)
Laboratory measures of reciprocity (C92)Real-world donation behavior (D64)

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