Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP7476
Authors: Winand Emons; Claude Fluet
Abstract: An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors, or the two parties to the conflict may present further evidence. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favor at a cost. At equilibrium the two parties never testify together. When the evidence is much in favor of one party, this party testifies. When the evidence is close to the prior mean, no party testifies. We compare this outcome under a purely adversarial procedure with the outcome under a purely inquisitorial procedure (Emons and Fluet 2009). We provide sufficient conditions on when one procedure is better than the other one.
Keywords: adversarial; costly state falsification; evidence production; inquisitorial; procedure
JEL Codes: D82; K41; K42
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| evidence distribution (D39) | parties' decision to testify (K41) |
| strength of evidence (C90) | likelihood of testimony (K41) |
| adversarial procedure (K41) | control over testimony process (K41) |
| inquisitorial procedure (K40) | control over testimony process (K41) |
| testimony (Y60) | adjudication accuracy (K41) |
| testimony (Y60) | social costs associated with adjudication (K41) |