Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP7454
Authors: Pedro Luis Pita Barros; Joseph A. Clougherty; Jo Seldeslachts
Abstract: We show that the number of merger proposals (frequency-based deterrence) is a more appropriate indicator of underlying changes in merger policy than the relative anti-competitiveness of merger proposals (composition-based deterrence). This has strong implications for the empirical analysis of the deterrence effects of merger policy enforcement, and potential implications regarding how to reduce anti-competitive merger proposals.
Keywords: Antitrust; Deterrence; Merger Policy
JEL Codes: K21; L40; L49
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Frequency-based deterrence (number of merger notifications) (L42) | likelihood of proposals being made (D72) |
| A decrease in antitrust scrutiny (L49) | frequency of merger proposals (G34) |
| Increased scrutiny (G18) | fewer anticompetitive proposals (L49) |
| Frequency-based deterrence (number of merger notifications) (L42) | reduced anticompetitive proposals (L49) |